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ALIENS-DECLARANT'S LIABILITY TO MILITARY SERVICE-CONFLICT OF STATUTE
AND TREATY.-The petitioner, a native of Spain, who had declared his intention
of becoming a citizen of the United States, was arrested off the coast of
Mexico, while returning to Spain, charged with evading the Selective Draft
Act. He sued out a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the treaty
of 19o3 between the United States and Spain exempted him from "compulsory
military service." The Selective Draft Act of May 18, 1917, subjected declarant
non-enemy aliens to liability to military service. Held, that the statute prevailed
over the treaty and that the writ must be denied. Ex parte Larrucea (1917,
S. D. Cal.) :249 Fed. 981.
It is beyond doubt that under the Constitution a statute and a treaty are on
a parity and in a judicial proceeding before the courts, if they should conflict,
the latest in point of time will prevail.' Cherokee Tobacco Cases (I87O, U. S.)
ii Wall 616; Head Money Cases (1884) 112 U. S. 58o, 598, 5 Sup. Ct. 247. But
this does not necessarily determine the final disposition of the matter, for the
alien whose treaty privileges have been impaired or violated by a subsequent
municipal statute has available the extraordinary remedy of appeal for diplo-
matic protection to his national government. That government may then protest
to our State Department to obtain recognition for the treaty rights of its sub-
jects or citizens, which, if valid, will hardly be withheld. See COMMENTS (1918)
27 Y= LAW JOURNAL, 683. On a previous occasion (during the Civil War)
when Congress subjected declarants who had exercised the voting privilege
to liability to military service, the protests of foreign countries were heeded
by Congress by extending to the declarant the option of serving or leaving the
country within 65 days. I Halleck, Int. Law (3d ed.) 558. The present
Congress has yielded to these protests to the extent of giving neutral declarants,
whether citizens of treaty countries or not, the option of serving or of with-
drawing their declarations of intention, which shall operate to cancel the declara-
tion of intention and forever to debar them from the privilege of becoming
American citizens. Act of August 31, 1918 (Public, No. 21o, 65th Cong. sec. I).
ALIENs-NATURALIzATION-APPLICANT'S VIOLATION OF SUNDAY SALOON LAV--
Prior to October io, 1915, the municipal authorities of Chicago made no effort
to enforce the state law which forbade the opening of saloons on Sunday. The
applicant, a saloon-keeper, whose petition for naturalization was filed January
25, 1916, had violated the Sunday closing law until notified that after the date
first mentioned the law would be enforced. Thereafter he obeyed it. The
naturalization statute provides that it must appear to the court that the applicant,
during the five years preceding his application, "has behaved as a man of good
moral character" and "well disposed to the good order and happiness of" the
United States. Held, that the applicant was not entitled to naturalization.
United States v. Gersteint (1918, Ill.) 119 N. E. 922.
The court argues that a man who knowingly disobeys the law does not behave
as a man of good moral character, even though the public sentiment of a large
part of the community disapproves the law in question and though the public
authorities have not attempted to enforce it. An opposite conclusion was
reached in respect to a saloon-keeper in Milwaukee, where the Wisconsin Sun-
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day law had been "honored in the breach" for forty years. In re Hopp (191o,
D. C. Wis.) I79 Fed. 561. The argument advanced in the latter case that the
standard of conduct contemplated by the statute does not require the applicant
to rise above the level of the mass of the people, is persuasive; yet it is believed
that the principal case presents the safer view. It is a dangerous doctrine to
admit that good citizens may habitually disregard law. The remedy for an
unpopular law is repeal, not violation. But quaere whether there might not be
a difference according to the character of the law violated-a habitually disre-
garded traffic ordinance, for instance. In any case, as the court intimates, the
applicant has not lost his privilege of citizenship forever. After good behavior
for the requisite time he may apply again.
ALIENS-NATURALIZATION-CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATE FOR FRAUD EVI-
DENCED By LOYALTY To ENEMY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN.-A naturalized American
citizen of German origin, having made statements which indicated his attachment
and loyalty to Germany rather than to the United States, a proceeding was insti-
tuted under section 15 of the Act of June 29, i9o6 (34 Stat. L. 6ox) for the
cancellation of his certificate of naturalization on the ground of fraud in its
procurement, the applicant's oath at the time of naturalization to the effect
that he "absolutely and entirely" renounced and abjured all allegiance to any
foreign sovereignty and particularly to the Emperor of Germany having been
false. Held, that the certificate of naturalization was obtained by fraud and
must be cancelled. United States v. Wursterbarth (1918, N. J.) 249 Fed. 908.
A similar holding was made in United States v. Darnter (1918, W. D. Wash.)
249 Fed. 989. A certificate of naturalization is not only an evidence of. citizen-
ship, but, emanating from the judicial department of the government, it is also
the evidence of a judgment. Attorney-General Ackerman erroneously held that
it was a judgment binding only on parties and their privies; hence that the
United States was not concluded by a fraudulent certificate of naturalization
(1871) 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 376. The true ground is rather that a judgment in
rein may be attacked for fraud, or that, being an ex parte proceeding, the United
States is not concluded by the certificate granted. Johannessen v. United States
(1911) 225 U. S. 227, 237, 32 Sup. Ct. 613. Even before the Act of Congress of
June 29, 19o6, which for the first time gave statutory power to the Department
of Justice to institute direct proceedings for the cancellation of fraudulently
obtained certificates of naturalization, it had been held that only the United
States and not a State or private parties could impeach the record of naturaliza-
tion. United States v. Norrch (1890, C. C., E. D. Mo.) 42 Fed. 417; Petersen
v. State (1905, Tex.) 89 S. W. 81 (State cannot); Commonwealth v. Paper
(1868, Pa.) i Brewster 263, 267 (private individuals cannot). Section 15 of
the Act of 19o6 has been held by the Supreme Court to be retroactive. Johannes-
sen v. United States, supra; Luria v. United States (1913) 231 U. S. 9, 34 Sup.
Ct. io. It therefore covers the case of individuals who, like the defendant in the
principal case, were naturalized prior to its passage. The Department of Justice
has limited its proceedings under the statute to cases in which it seemed that
the result of the suit would benefit the citizenship of the country. The Depart-
ment's Circular letter No. lO7 of Sept. 20, 19o9, reads in part: "The legislation
referred to, being retroactive, is construed to be remedial rather than penal in
its nature; for the protection of the body politic rather than for the punishment
of the individual concerned." Most of the proceedings instituted under the Act
have involved clear cases of fraud on the part of the applicant, usually false
allegations under oath as to the length of his residence in the United States,
or as to other essential facts. United States v. Mansour (19o8, S. D. N. Y.)
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17o Fed. 671; United States v. Alberthni (1913, Mont.) 206 Fed. 133. But the
statute itself provides that certain acts subsequent to naturalization shall be
construed as prima facie evidence that the naturalization was obtained in bad
faith, e. g., proceeding abroad within five years after naturalization to take up
a permanent residence there. So it seems reasonable that clear evidence
afforded by subsequently spoken words of the falsity of the oath renouncing
allegiance to a foreign sovereign, an essential condition of naturalization, proves
fraud in obtaining citizenship. To determine a person's state of mind at a given
time, it is proper to consider subsequently spoken words or evidence of a subse-
quent state of mind. Waterman v. Whitney (1854) II N. Y. 157. Wigmore,
Evidence, sec. 233. Although 36 and 30 years respectively had elapsed since
the naturalization of the defendants in the principal case and the other recent
case which accords with it, it is not unreasonable to suppose, said the court,
that the attachment to the native country, only now openly avowed, was stronger
at the time of naturalization than now. Provided the evidence of alien loyalty
is convincing, it is not unfair to conclude that the mental reservation thereof
at the time of naturalization, though latent and not manifested for many years,
falsified the oath by means of which the certificate of naturalization was secured,
and constitutes that fraud which justifies cancellation proceedings.
ARMY AND NAvY-CRMINAL OFFENSES-IMMUNITY OF NAVAL DISPATCH
DRIVER VIOLATING STATE SPEED LAW BY ORDER OF SUPERIOR OFFICER.-A criminal
complaint was brought against the defendant for violating the automobile speed
law of Rhode Island, and the following question of law was certified to the
State Supreme Court: "Is a man of the U. S. Naval Reserve Force, on duty
as a dispatch driver, amenable to the provisions of [the state motor vehicle
law] while acting under specific instructions of his superior officer to proceed
in a motor vehicle with all possible dispatch along one of the highways of the
state, which instruction said man was obliged to obey, which instruction was
assumed by said officer to necessitate the violation by said man of the speed
laws of the state, and which instruction was given by said officer in a matter
deemed by him to be of urgency and appertaining to the conduct of the war
between the United States and Germany?" Held, that the question should be
answered in the negative. State v. Burton (1918, R. I.) 1O3 Atl. 962.
See COMMENTS, p. 61.
BILLS AND NOTES-HOLDER IN DUE CotURSE-USURY AS DEFENS.-The defend-
ant executed a promissory note for $2,IOO, payable to the order of one F, and
delivered it to the latter as his agent for the purpose of having it discounted.
F sold it to the plaintiff for $1,85o, endorsing it and delivering it in the usual
way. To a suit on the note the defendant pleaded usury. Held, that the
plaintiff, although a holder in due course, was not entitled to recover. Sabine v.
Paine (1918, N. Y.) 119 N. E. 849.
Whether -usury is a mere personal defense not available against a holder in due
course, or an absolute defense good against everyone, depends upon the usury
statute of the particular jurisdiction concerned. The present case is of interest
because it settles apparently for the first time the effect of the uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law upon the usury law of New York in force at the
time of its passages That law expressly declared that all "bonds, bills, notes . . .
tainted with usury" were void and that upon proof of the facts "the court
shall declare the same to be void, and enjoin any prosecution thereon, and
order the same to be surrendered and cancelled." General Business Law (N. Y.
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Cons. Laws, ch. 20) secs. 370, 371, 373. The present case holds that the later
enactment of section 96 (New York numbering) of the N. I. L. (section 57
of the original N. I. L.) did not effect the repeal of this usury law, in spite
of the fact that section 96 provides that "the holder in due course holds the
instrument free from any defect of tile of prior parties and free from defenses
available to prior parties among themselves." Earlier cases in the lower courts
of New York were conflicting, but a large majority of the judges of the Court
of Appeals had in dicta expressed themselves in accordance with the decision
now reached. For the earlier cases see Norton, Bills and Notes (4th ed.) 304,
note 64, and the opinion of the Appellate Division in the principal case (915)
166 N. Y. App. Div. 9, 151 N. Y. Supp. 735.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-EXTRATERRITORIAL STATUTES-NEw YORK ACTION FOR
DEATH CAUSED IN MASSACHUSE~s.-A resident of New York was negligently
killed in Massachusetts by a New York corporation's servant who was acting.
within the scope of his employment. The administrators of the deceased sued
the corporation in New York for the benefit of the widow and children, claim-
ing to be entitled to recover according to the terms of the Massachusetts statute
relating to wrongful killing. The statute in question provided that the damages
should be "assessed with reference to the degree of culpability" of the defend-
ant or (in this case) its servant, rather than according to the loss suffered by
the widow and children, differing in this respect from the New York statute.
Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover in accordance with the terms
of the Massachusetts statute. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York (IgiP,
N. Y.) 12o N. E. i98.
See COMMENTS, p. 67.
CONTRACTS-ANTICIPATORY BREEcH-WAIVER OF REPUDIATIN.-The plaintiff
had contracted with the defendant to deliver a quantity of merchandise in install--
ments, each to be paid for within thirty days after its delivery. After the second
delivery the plaintiff repudiated; the defendant repeatedly tried, in vain, to
induce the plaintiff to continue performance. When payment on the second
delivery came due, the defendant refused to pay unless the plaintiff would go
on with his contract. Relying on the defendant's actions as first a waiver of the
repudiation, and then a breach of the contract, the plaintiff sued to recover the
price of the goods delivered. The defendant counterclaimed for damages aris-
ing from the repudiation. Held, that the conduct of the defendant was not such
a "waiver" as a matter of law, and that the plaintiff's repudiation was a
"continuing breach of which the defendant was at liberty to avail at any time
during its continuance." Hadfield v. Coiter (1918, App. T.) i7o N. Y. Supp. 643.
Repudiation is a communication by a promissor to a promisee of intention
not to perform further. Its legal effect is to give the promisee (I) a privilege
and power to create in himself a right to damages for breach of the entire
contract, by accepting the repudiation as final, before it is withdrawn. Kadish v.
Young (1883) lO8 Ill. 170; Roehm v. Horst (1899) 178 U. S. i, 20 Sup. Ct. 780.
It gives the promisee also (2) a privilege and power to elect not to exercise this
power to accept the repudiation; and thereby-subject to the rules on wilfully
increasing damages-to nullify it, leaving the contract "open": i. e., restoring
the duties of both parties to full effect, and making the promisee himself liable,
as originally, for any future default. Johnstone v. Milling (i886, C. A.). x6
Q. B. D. 460; Claes etc. Mfg. Co. v. McCord (1896) 65 Mo. App. 507. This is
a "waiver" of the repudiation. But (3) the promisee is also privileged by the
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repudiation to take, without prejudice to his rights or power, a reasonable time
within which to make his election. This is the holding in the principal case.
And the opinion properly stresses that the exercise of this privilege must not,
until the expiration of that reasonable time, be confused with an election not
to accept the repudiation. If there had been no repudiation by the plaintiff
here, such a failure as the defendant's, to perform an installment or a part of the
contract which went to the root of the contract, would have given the plaintiff
(a) a right to damages for breach of the installment-see Gerli v. Poidebard Co.
(1895, Ct. Er.) 57 N. J. L. 432, 31 At. 401-and (b) a privilege of refusing
further performance himself, together with a right to damages for breach of
the entire contract,-National Machine & Tool Co. v. Standard, etc., Co. (19o2)
181 Mass. 275, 63 N. E. 9oo-and finally, (c) a privilege and power to waive
(b) without affecting (a). Garfield, etc., Coal Co. v. Fitchburg Ry. Co. (1896)
166 Mass. 1ig, 44 N. E. xg; see Pollock, C. B., in Hoare v. Rennie" (x859, Ex.)
5 H. & N. ig. What effect did the plaintiff's prior repudiation have on the
above? The defendant and the court assumed-and it is believed, properly,--
that repudiation did not affect (a) : the defendant's duty to make up in damages
for failure to pay the price of the installment of goods delivered and accepted.
But the prior repudiation was rightly held to keep the consequence (b) from
attaching to the defendant's refusal to perform his installment during the
reasonable time described above under (3): that is, he did not, while deciding
whether to accept the unwithdrawn repudiation or to reject it definitely, become
liable for brdach of the contract as a whole by his holding up temporarily a
payment which he was ready to make, if the plaintiff should decide to go ahead
with the contract. This is sound sense and sound law. See Sperry & Hutchin-
son Co. v. O'lVeill-Adams Co. (igi, C. C. A. 2d) 185 Fed. 231; contra Zuck v.
McClure (1881) 98 Pa. 541, semble. It is submitted, moreover, that the court
properly decided that the efforts of the promisee to induce the promisor to
revoke his repudiation constituted no "waiver," and in no way altered the above
operative effects of that repudiation. Cf. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. O'Neill-
Adams Co., supra.
CoNTRacrs-OPTioNs-"DouBLE OiioNs."--Mrs. S. for valid consideration
made an agreement with one C. regarding certain of her real estate, "meaning
thereby to give to the said A. R. Carrano the option upon the purchase of said
property [at an agreed price] if the said parties of the first part [Mrs. S. and
son] at any time desire to sell said property." Mrs. S. brought suit nine years
later to have the agreement cancelled and her property freed from any
incumbrance by reason thereof. Held, that the agreement, a "double option,"
under which the plaintiff might elect to sell or not to sell, be cancelled, as after
nine years it was to be presumed that she had elected not to sell at the price.
Saraceno v. Carrano (1918) 92 Conn. 563, lO3 At. 631.
See COMMENTS, p. 65.
COURTS-ADvISORY OPINIONS OF JUDGES-NEcESSITY OF AcTuAL LITIGATION-
The State Industrial Commission of New York, being in doubt whether it had
power to adopt and put into execution a certain resolution, certified the question
of power to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division, acting under what
it believed to be a duty imposed upon it by the state statutes, answered the ques-
tion in the affirmatii'e. Certain persons who had been permitted to intervene
and file briefs as interested parties asked for leave to appeal to the Court of
Appeals. This leave was granted. Held, that the Appellate Division was not
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authorized to give the advisory opinion. In re Workmees Compensation Fund
(1918, N. Y.) iig N. E. lO27.
The decision is based primarily upon the ground that, under the correct reading
of the statute concerned, the Industrial Commission could certify questions of
law to the Appellate Division only when they were incidental to a pending
controversy with adverse parties litigant. The larger part of the admirably brief
and concise opinion of Cardozo, J., is devoted to a review of the authorities and
discussions relating to advisory opinions, and follows what may be called the
orthodox view, viz., that the legislature cannot, in the absence of express con-
stitutional authority, impose upon the courts the non-judicial function of
answering questions of law apart from actual litigation. In justification of this
view the opinion says: "The proposed resolution may be valid as to some . . .
and invalid as to others. We are asked by an omnibus answer to an omnibus
question to adjudge the rights of all. That is not the way in which a system
of case law develops. We deal with the particular instance; and we wait until
it arises." The point of view of the common law lawyer has perhaps never
been better expressed. Whether this system has given results as excellent as
past generations of lawyers would have us believe may be open to question, but
that it is our system is beyond dispute. The arguments in favor of calling upon
the American judiciary for advisory opinions on constitutional questions, as
well as the history of the subject, are fully presented by Professor Albert R.
Ellingwood of Colorado College in his recent book, Departmental Co-operation
in State Government, a review of which will appear in the December issue of
the YALE LAW JOURNAL.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-SEPARATION AGREEMENTS-EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT MIS-
CONDUCT BY WIFE.-A husband and wife- agreed to live apart, the husband
promising to pay the wife for her support a definite sum weekly. Subsequently
the wife committed adultery and the husband refused to make payments falling
due thereafter. The wife sued to recover such payments. Held, that the mis-
conduct of the wife was a defense to the suit. Devine v. Devine (1918, N. J.
Ch.) lO4 At. 370.
On the same facts the English courts permit a recovery. ree v. Thurlow
(1824, K. B.) 2 B. & C. 547; Sweet v. Sweet [1895] x Q. B. 12. The New Jersey
court gives two reasons for holding the New Jersey law to be different from
the English law. One is that in England agreements of this kind are prepared
by skilled solicitors who embody dum casta clauses in the agreements, so that
omission of a clause of that kind may well be held to signify that the husband
agrees to pay even though the wife misconduct herself. The other reason is
that a separation agreement has under New Jersey law legal effects which differ
in important respects from its effects under English law. According to the latter
the separation agreement is a contract with all the usual legal consequences.
Besant v. Wood (1878) 12 Ch. D. 605, and cases there cited. According to the
New Jersey law, however, while such an agreement confers upon each of the
parties a legal privilege to live apart from the other, thus putting an end to
the previously existing legal duty to live with the other, it is, nevertheless,
"revocable," i. e., the legal privilege of each is subject to a legal power in the
other to terminate the privilege by suitable notice and so to bring into existence
again a duty to live with the other spouse. This rule apparently has been
adopted in New Jersey on the ground that it is contrary to public policy to give
to the separation agreement the consequences attached by English law. It fol-
lows that the agreement of the husband to make the stipulated weekly payments
has legal effects comparable to those resulting from a continuing offer, revocable
RECENT CASE NOTES
at will; i. e., it confers upon the wife a legal power to acquire, by continuing
to live apart and to perform the other parts of the agreement as well as her
duties growing out of her status as a married woman, a legal right to the pay-
ment for that week. There is, of course, a correlative liability on the part of
the husband, so long as he does not revoke, to have the correlative duty to pay
imposed upon him by the wife's so acting. 'However, as in the case of the offer,
the power of the wife is subject to a power of revocation in the husband, i. e.,
the husband may at any time by proper notice terminate it. There exists, there-
fore a correlative liability on the part of the wife to have her power destroyed
by the husband; her power is not accompanied by an immunity from destruction,
as it would be under the English law. Apparently most American courts assume
that these separation agreements result in contractual obligations, if one may
judge from the tenor of the opinions, but the point actually decided usually
is merely that the wife may recover installments past due-a result also reached
on the New Jersey theory. It should be noted that the decision reached in the
principal case can quite as easily be arrived at by regarding the separation agree-
ment as an irrevocable contract, on the ground that the resulting contractual
obligation of the husband to make the payments is conditional upon the con-
tinued good conduct of the wife. Upon this ground the court in Roth v. Roth
(1912, Co. Ct.) 138 N. Y. Supp. 573, on similar facts reached the same result as
that in the principal case.
INsURANcE-RIGHTS OF BENEFicIaY-LmrrATIONS ON POWER TO CHANGE
BENE=cARY-The defendant company issued an insurance policy upon the life
of John Neary, whose wife, the present plaintiff, was named as beneficiary. The
policy provided that the insured might change the beneficiary by written notice
accompanied by the policy, the change to be effective upon indorsement thereof
on the policy by the company. John Neary later sent written notice of a change
to the company and the company assented and noted the change in its books.
No indorsement was made on the policy because it was in the plaintiff's posses-
sion. The plaintiff paid all the premiums, including one after the attempted
change, and at no time was.informed of the change. Held, that no change had
been effected and that the plaintiff was entitled to the insurance money.
Wheeler, J., dissenting. Neary v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1918) 92 Conn.
488, 1o3 Adt. 661.
The majority opinion holds that the existing facts created a "legal interest"
in the first beneficiary and not a "mere expectancy," even though the interest
was "qualified" by the reserved power tp change, and that there was no power
to change except by proceeding as prescribed in the policy. If facts create
nothing more than an "expectancy," they create nothing at all other than a
state of mind. An "expectancy" involves no legal relations whatever. The
term "legal interest," however, indicates that legal relations exist. In the
absence of any reserved power in the insured, those legal relations seem to be
as follows. The beneficiary has what is usually called a "conditional right"
against the insurer, and the insured has no power (i. e. he has a disability) to
terminate this right by any purely voluntary act of his own. The beneficiary
has no active and instantly enforceable right against the insurer (except perhaps
a right that the insurer shall not repudiate); but nevertheless the conditional
right when accompanied by the disability is an interest that is much more than
a mere "expectancy." In the principal case, however, there was no such dis-
ability. The insured having reserved the power to change, the beneficiary had
a liability that her conditional right might be extinguished. Where the power
to change is reserved the intention seems to be to make the beneficiary's future
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right dependent upon the will of the insured, and no particular importance should
ordinarily be given to the method of expressing his will and of exercising his
power to change the beneficiary, at least so far as a mere'donee is concerned.
In the present case the beneficiary is more than a mere donee, having paid the
premiums. A substantial change of position like this is often held to be an
operative fact terminating legal powers previously existing, and it was here
properly held to limit the power of the insured so that it could thereafter be
exercised only in the exact method prescribed in the policy. A mere quasi-
contractual right to the return of the premiums paid would not satisfy the
average man's sense of justice. The question is one of policy to be solved by
an appeal to the prevailing mores, and not merely by logic and the use of such
terms as "vested interest." See the discussion of a similar case in (1918) 27
YALE LAW JoURNAL, 957.
JOINT TORTFEASORS-RELEASE OF ONE RESERVING RIGHTS AGAINST THE OTHER.-
The plaintiff, who was injured through the joint negligence of the defendant
and a railroad company, covenanted for a consideration not to sue the railroad.
The instrument expressly reserved the right to proceed against the defendant,
and stated that it was executed not in full settlement of the entire cause but
only as "a mere quitclaim" in so far as the cause related to the railroad. Held,
that this agreement did not bar suit against the defendant. Berry v. Pullman
Co. (1918, C. C. A. 5th) 249 Fed. 816.
At common law a, technical release of one joint tortfeasor operated to release
the others as well. Cocke v. Jennor (1614, K. B.) Hob. 66; Gunther v. Lee
(1876) 45 Md. 6o. The rule is logically indefensible. When two defendants
together violate the plaintiff's primary rights, the law gives him a secondary
right to damages against either. He can have only one satisfaction; but release
of the one tortfeasor is an election to seek that satisfaction from the other.
There is no logic to make such election release both. See 2 Wigmore, Select
Cases on Torts, 866. The rule is also inconvenient and unjust; and it shackles
compromise. Nevertheless, it became firmly fixed in the law. Seither v. Phila-
delphia Traction Co. (1889) 125 Pa. 397, 17 Atl. 338; Carpenter v. McElwain
(1916, N. H.) 97 Atl. 56o (semble). The cure was found in the covenant not
to sue, which was a personal agreement without effect upon the cause of action,
although to prevent circuity of action it was recognized to bar suit against the
covenantee. Hutton v. Eyre (1815, C. P.) 6 Taunt 289; Duck v. Mayeu [1892]
2 Q. B. 511. Some confusion exists when, as frequently happens, the instrument
purports to "release" one tortfeasor, but "reserves all rights" against the other.
If the word "release," or the fact of discharging the one, is held technically
operative to release the other, the reservation must be void for repugnancy;
and so some courts hold. Abb v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (i9o2) 28 Wash. 428,
68 Pac. 954. The saner view is to construe the instrument as a whole, inquiring
especially whether the consideration given for its execution was or was not
accepted by the plaintiff as a complete satisfaction of his damages. If his
expressed intent was to reserve his right-of action against the other wrongdoer,
that intent should rule, and the instrument be given the effect of a covenant not
to sue. Many courts have so held. Dwy v. Connecticut Co. (915) 89 Conn.
74, 92 AtI. 883; Smith v. Dixie (913) 128 Tenn: 112, 157 S. W. 900; Edens v.
Fletcher (19o8) 79 Kan. 139, 98 Pac. 784, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 618 and note.
This is the doctrine applied in the principal case, despite the use of the technical
word "quitclaim" in the plaintiff's settlement with the railroad. Against this
more-liberal view the argument has been advanced that permitting individual
settlements may open the way to obtaining satisfaction beyond the amount of
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the damage suffered. McBride v. Scott (19o3) I32 Mich. 176, 93 N. W. 243.
This seems scarcely tenable; for anything received by the plaintiff in satisfaction
will reduce pro tanto his recovery against the other defendants. 34 Cyc. 1089.
Hence a satisfaction complete in fact will bar suit against any. Johnson v.
Von Scholly (1914) 218 Mass. 454, io6 N. E. 17; Wagner v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co.
(1914) 265 Ill. 245, io6 N. E. 8og. All the above discussion is to be taken with
due regard to means of proving intention expressed in writing; for instance,
to the conclusiveness of recitals under seal. See Johnson v. Von Scholly, supra.
For discussion of the effect of releasing one joint tortfeasor against whom the
other has a claim for indemnity, see CommENTs (1915) 24 YALE LAw JoURNAL,
505.
NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF TRA1i'c LAw NOT NEGLIGENcE PER SL-The Traffic
Act of New Jersey, Pub. L. 1915, ch. 156, sec. 2 (6), provides that "a vehicle
turning into another road to the left, shall, before turning, pass, when possible,
to the right of and beyond the center of the intersection of the two roads."
The defendant in his automobile turned a corner without complying with the
above directions, and collided with and injured the plaintiff on his motorcycle.
The lower court directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the ground that such
non-compliance constituted per se a tortfeasance, and the defendant appealed.
Held, that the direction of a verdict was error, since the violation of the traffic
law by the defendant was only one element to be left with the others to the
jury. Winch v. Johnson (1918, N. J. Ct. Er.) 1O4 At. 81.
The Traffic Act further provides, sec. 4 (1), for right of way at an inter-
section to the vehicle approaching from the right. The plaintiff, who desired
to turn off, gave the proper statutory signals; the defendant, who had the
right of way, failed to slow down from some 25 miles an hour, and a collision
of the automobiles resulted. The plaintiff recovered judgment. Held, that the
judgment was correct, since the right of way conferred by the statute was not
absolute, with a dictum that compliance with the Traffic Act did not per se
relieve a man of the common law duty to observe existing conditions and guide
his machine accordingly. Paulsen v. Klinge (1918, N. J. Sup. Ct) IO4 At. 95.
The express "when possible" provision of the statute in the Winch Case
merely gives legislative sanction to results very generally reached even without
such provision. See Temple v. Walker (1917, Ark.) 192 S. W. 2oo; Heryford
v. Spitcaufsky (1917, Mo. App.) 2oo S. W. 123. But the effect in law of rules
of the road is neither uniform, nor, it would seem, wholly settled. It seems
clear that they free the driver of a vehicle from having to look out for viola-
tion of them under pain, in case of collision, of being held negligent: so as to
render him liable as a defendant, or to bar his action as a plaintiff. Ballard v.
Collins (1911) 63 Wash. 493, 115 Pac. 1050 (plaintiff); see Cook Brewing Co.
v. Ball (1899) 22 Ind. App. 656, 665; 52 N. E. 1002, 1004 (defendant). It is
clear on the other hand that observance of those rules does not in itself relieve
a defendant of liability for collision, nor, it would seem, prove a plaintiff free
from contributory negligence. Erwin v. Traud (1917, N. 3. Ct. Er.) Ioo Atl.
184, L. R A. 1917 D, 69o and note. Despite the language of some courts in
special circumstances, as in Freeman v. Green (1916, Mo. App.) 186 S. W. 166,
it seems also clear both that non-compliance with road regulations is not
negligence per se, but may be excused by circumstances, and that the last clear
chance doctrine applies to both plaintiff and defendant. See cases cited (i913)
41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 322, 337, 346. In Colorado, indeed, the plaintiff's failure to
keep a lookout for a vehicle which had the right of way seems to have been
held per se contributory negligence. Livingston v. Barney (1917, Colo.) 163
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Pac. 863. But it is believed that the plaintiff's position should be governed
as to negligence per se by the same principles which in the Winch Case and the
mass of authorities are applied to the defendant. In the case of speed laws,
too, either the statutes or the courts generally make allowance for varying
conditions of traffic in determining the violation of their letter to be negligence.
Irwin v. Judge (igog) 81 Conn. 492, 71 Atl. 572. But where exceeding the speed
limit is itself shown to have been the proximate cause of the damage, Minne-
sota has held such viblation to be negligence per se. Riser v. Smith (1917,
Minn.) 162 N. W. 520. It is believed that the better rule considers the fact
of the violation of such a law or ordinance to raise a presumption of negligence,
sufficient to cause a directed verdict in the absence of any other showing, but
rebuttable. Hartje v. Moxley (19o8) 235 111. 164, 85 N. E. 216 (by statute as
to motor vehicles). And it is believed that the language of other courts which
seem to hold such violation to be negligence per se would and should be read in
proper circumstances to accord with the rule here suggested. Cf. National
Casket Co. v. Powar (I9IO) 137 Ky. 156, 125 S. W. 279. That rule makes due
allowance for variation of circumstances, while enforcing a presumption which
fits the thinking of the people at large. A similar presumption has been occa-
sionally enforced in rule of the road cases. Buxton v. Ainsworth (19o4) 138
Mich. 532, IOI N. W. 817. It is submitted that sound growth of the law calls
for violation of such road laws, instead of being merely one fact sufficient
to go to the jury and to sustain a verdict, to be held broadly to raise a rebuttable
presumption of negligence or contributory negligence in the violator. Tested
by this the rule in Paulsen v. Klinge is wholly satisfactory; also that in Winch v.
Johnson, so far as that case refuses to hold the defendant's conduct negligence
per se;. but that decision may, it is believed, be properly criticized for failure
to raise the presumption here suggested.
TAXATIOx-INHIERITANCE AND TRANSFER TAXEs-TAx ON PowER OF APPOINT-
mENT ExEacisFn ax DB.--A testator who died in 1876, before any statute
imposed an inheritance or transfer tax, devised real estate in New York City,
giving to his son a life estate, with power to appoint in fee by deed or will
to his issue or to his sisters or their issue, and limiting the remainder in case
of a failure to appoint, to the son's issue or, in default of issue, to his sisters.
In 1911 the son exercised the power of appointment and conveyed the property,
including his own life estate, to his sisters in different proportions and inter-
ests. They immediately took possession. Three years later the son died, and
proceedings were instituted to levy a tax upon his estate in respect to these
lands, pursuant to section 22o of the New York Transfer Tax Law. The
Surrogate confirmed a tax based upon the value of the lands at the date of the
conveyance less the value of the son's life estate therein. The Appellate Divi-
sion reversed this decision. Held, that the exercise of the power of appointment
was taxable under the statute and that such a tax was constitutional. In re
Wendel's Estate ('1918, N. Y.) iIg N. E. 879.
Under the legislation of some of the states the creation of a power of appoint-
ment by the donor rather than its exercise by the donee is regarded as the act
which effects a taxable transfer. Kansas v. U. S. Trust Co. (1917) 99 Kan. 841,
163 Pac. 156; see Ross, Inheritance Taxation, io6. But New York and certain
other states have legislated upon the opposite theory. The principal case pre-
sents for the first time to the New York Court of Appeals the important ques-
tion whether an appointment by deed not made in contemplation' of death is a
taxable transfer. The initial inquiry is, of course, one of construction of the
statutory language. The sixth subdivision of section 22o of the Transfer Tax
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provides that "whenever any person or corporation shall exercise a power of
appointment . . such appointment when made shall be deemed a transfer
taxable . . . in the same manner as though the property [appointed] belonged
absolutely to the donee of such power and had been bequeathed or devised by
such donee by will." This language, the court holds, since not limited to a
particular form of transfer, must be given its ordinary meaning which includes
an appointment by deed as well as one by will-particularly since a corporation,
which is obviously contemplated as a possible donee of a power of appointment,
cannot act by will. The argument for a more limited construction had pre-
vailed below. In re Wende's Estate (1917, 'App. Div.) i68 N. Y. Supp. 297.
The second inquiry involves the constitutionality of such a tax. The validity
of a tax upon the execution of a power of appointment by will had long been
established. Chanler v. Kelsey (1907) 205 U. S. 466, 27 Sup. Ct 550. Clearly
it is as much the exercise of a power to appoint by deed as it is to appoint by
will, and no valid constitutional objection exists to taxing such a power. It
should be noted, however, that where the execution of the power of appoint-
ment does 'not pass to the persons in whose favor it is exercised more than
they would take under the will of the donor of the power in default of an
appointment, the property, for purposes of the transfer tax, is deemed to pass
under the will of the donor. Matter of Lansing (i9o5) 182 N. Y. 238, 74 N. E.
882; In re Chauncey's Estate (1918, Surr. Ct.) 168 N. Y. Supp. lO19. But cf.
Minot vr. Stevens (1911) 2o7 Mass. 588, 93 N. E. 973. In the principal case the
sisters acquired by the exercise of the power of appointment a different title
than they had under the will of the donor.
